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Defendant/Appellant responds only to certain issues raised 
in Plaintiff/Appellee's brief. Most matters were adequately 
handled in Appellant's brief and will not be repeated here. 
Point I: THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY 
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
The State cites State v. Bailey 675 P2d 1203, at 1205-6, 
(1984) for the proposition that less proof of knowledge, 
veracity, and reliability is required if the circumstances as a 
whole indicate the informant's report is truthful. The 
circumstances as a whole indicate untruthfulness. Bailey, at 
1206, indicates some of the factors to be considered are 
disinteredness, and whether the witness had anything to gain or 
lose from the testimony. Mr. Pommier's testimony was at best 
suspicious. He made a copy of a key he found (see Reporter's 
Transcript of Motion to Supress, hereinafter "S", p. 108), with a 
1 
surreptitious intent (S 109). He broke into the garage six times 
(S 114). It was almost a full year before he went to the police 
to report this situation. (Between July or August, 1987, when he 
made the key copy (S 92) and June of 1988 when he finally spoke 
to Officer Yeates (S 95)). Mr. Pommier testified he had a 
"guilty conscience11 concerning this (S 95). Defendant testified 
that he'd fired Pommier for taking money from Defendant's house 
(S 140). This matter had been reiterated in June, also (S 141). 
It must be considered how devastating such a charge against Mr. 
Pommier would have been to his affiliation with the Fire 
Department, his being Assistant Fire Marshal, or Acting Fire 
Marshal (S 142)that is, unless he could bring charges against 
Defendant first. While the State asserts that Mr. Pommier 
volunteered the information "with no claim for reward or legal 
favor", it is more plausible, given what he'd admitted, that it 
was done by Mr. Pommier, after such a long and secret delay, as a 
defensive move, to seek legal favor in the event Mr. Douglas 
actually brought charges against Mr. Pommier. 
What should've been corrected in the Affidavit Requesting 
Issuance of Search Warrant, and brought to the issuing judge's 
attention were: (1) the falsity of the statement that "...Phenyl-
2-Propane...[is a]... control led substance[s]... under the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act..." (page 5 of the Affidavit). The 
statement should said P-2-) is illegal under the Federal act, but 
not listed under the State Act. The judge did not have the 
benefit of that key information, which was affirmatively 
mistated. (2) The statement a "Clandestine-type" lab (page 2 of 
Affidavit) existed aggravated that improper statement. (3) The 
fact that the previous owner of the house was a chemistry teacher 
was not revealed. Detective Johnson knew this (S 54), as did the 
informant, Mr. Pommier (S 109), and it was not told to the 
issuing judge, and should be read back into the Affidavit. The 
State argues such things as that it was learned at trial that 
when the high school teacher sold the house, he left it empty. 
There is no showing that either Johnson or Pommier knew this 
constellation of facts, learned with "20-20 hindsight", and the 
judge was entitled to know what Johnson and Pommier knew and 
believed at the time, that is, that the previous owner was a high 
school chemistry teacher. Perhaps this is one of the reasons Mr. 
Pommier himself waited almost a year before informing authorities 
of the existence of the items. 
The State responds to the staleness argument with the 
statement that Appellant's cases are merely Federal cases. In 
the Affdavit, the informant is alleged to have "personally been 
in the residence on numerous occasions between the dates of 
January 1986 and April 22, 1988" (Affidavit, p. 3). United 
States v. Craig, 674 F Supp 561 (WD La, 1987) provides sound 
reason for a rule that when the affidavit describes a period of 
time without specifying dates, the events must be presumed to 
have occurred on the most remote dates. Attempting to counter 
this, the State cites State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
1983). However, in State v. Anderton, the court found the 
affidavit was "couched in present tense language" (at 1261). The 
affidavit in our case predominates in the past tense. The State 
opines that an on-going criminal activity was described, but no 
acts were cited supporting such an activity, other than the 
existence of certain equipment and chemicals over more than a two 
year period. Appellant can find no statement in the Affidavit 
that the equipment and chemicals were being used (other than 
below), or were even so much as moved during the two-year 
observation. The lack of evidence of actions is perhaps proof no 
activity was occuring. 
The Affidavit does cite an instance of Mr. Pommier smelling 
a "strong, chemical smell" while near the premises, and that on 
another date (unspecified) he'd smelled that odor. The affidavit 
itself cites (Affidavit, p.5) that the house is "surrounded by an 
orchard". No evidence is shown that Mr. Pommier had any 
expertise to distinguish normal pesticide smells from P-2-P, nor 
even that when he smelled the odors that he thought they were 
illicit. 
To support this on-going criminal activity theory, the State 
cites several sister-state cases. None deal with a case of 
chemicals and equipment being seen in a dormant state for a 
lengthy period of time. State v. King, 752 P.2d 869 (Or. App. 
1988), deals with a "large scale, on-going drug operation" 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 16) which implies widespread sales and 
activities, unlike our situation, which is possession of items 
legal in themselves. There are no sales in the case at bar. 
U.S. v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) dealt with a sizable 
cultivation of marijuana. Cultivation is by its nature a long-
term, on-going activity. There is no cultivation in the case at 
bar- State v. Garcia, 566 P.2d 426 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) deals 
with sales. In that case there was evidence of a daily habit, 
and numerous visits. In State v. Torrez, 544 P.2d 207 (Ariz. 
1975), numerous sales were shown within a period 30 days before. 
There are no sales activities in the case at bar. Finally, in 
State v. Austria, 524 P.2d 290 (Haw. 1974), regular gambling on 
Friday, Saturday, and Sunday nights, plus the informant's 
personal participation in the games, was shown to defeat the 
defendant's argument a 21-day delay in the games showed lack of 
an on-going activity. No activity at all is alleged against 
Appellant/Defendant in our case, except as above-stated. 
Point II: EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED BASED ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING 
PARTY WAS A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A 
WAY AS TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT 
The State reminds us of the many times Mr. Pommier protests 
that he entered the garage merely out of "curiosity" (S 93, 106, 
107, 113, 135; Trial Transcript 346, 354, and 355). Obviously, 
"curiosity" is a convenient pocket in which many mixed motives 
are sometimes carried, and the term as employed is more of an 
excuse than an explanation. The testimony offered many obvious 
conclusions as to the reasons for Mr. Pommier's entries over a 
one-year period prior to reporting his observations to 
authorities: preserving surreptitious opportunities, observing a 
water leak (first entry), leverage against Appellant, and 
conducting an investigation. Mr. Pommier testified that one 
reason he made a key was to further investigate (S 113). This 
investigation went on for almost a full year (S 92, S 95), and 
ended with a report to the police. He admits as Fire Marshal he 
had duties to inspect both commercial and residential (S 134: Q: 
So part of the job of a Fire Marshal and/or the Assistant Fire 
Marshal, his stated duties are the inspection of homes and 
businesses, true? A: There's actually no stated duties that 
I've ever seen written up, but that's my interpretation of it.") 
A very telling point is that if Mr. Pommier had been surprized in 
one of his inspections, can there be any doubt that one of the 
things he would've told Defendant is, after pointing to his 
police radio and beeper, that he was inspecting for fire and 
caustic chemical hazards in his capacity as Assistant Fire 
Marshal? 
The test in State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), was 
(1) the government's knowledge of or acquiescence in the 
intrusive conduct, and (2) the intent and purpose of the person 
conducting the search. As for the first prong, Mr. Pommier had 
worked with the police a lot of times when they were on scene for 
traffic control and fires (S 117), had been the Assistant Fire 
Marshal for periods during his work at Appellant/Defendant's 
house (S 100), often carried a police radio to work, and wore a 
beeper (S 98, 99). In fact, during the actual search of 
Defendant's house, Mr. Pommier was present acting in the paid (S 
127) capacity of Fire Chief (S 124), in charge of the Fire 
Department involvement (S 125). On that occasion, it was 
undeniable he was physically present as a government agent, and 
his presence then symbolized the crowning result of his earlier 
intrusions. As for the second prong, one reason he made the key, 
he admitted, was to further investigate (S 113). 
To deny he was a government agent here opens the door for 
every officer, when he knows he is afoul of the Fourth Amendment, 
to merely plead the unseemly, that he was acting ultra vires, or 
was on break when he did the offending act. Constitutional 
rights should not be dispensed with as easily as the agent 
changing his hat. 
The State attempts to defuse the unseemliness of the State 
using Mr. Pommier's break-ins, by attacking the case of State v. 
Louden, 387 P.2d 240 (Utah 1963), cited by Appellant for 
proposition that the court has supervisory authority over the 
officers and parties before it, which should be exercised where 
the sense of justice and constitutional rights of due process are 
involved. Defendant asks that the court should disallow evidence 
obtained illegally. True, Louden was vacated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1964, on another point (whether a hotel clerk had 
authority to consent to a room search on behalf of a hotel 
guest), but Louden was cited approvingly in the 1978 case of 
.State v. Adams, 583 P.2d 89 (Utah, 1978), for the proposition 
involved in the case at bar (at 91): 
"The means by which the trial court discharges its 
responsibility of seeing that justice is done may vary 
according to the circumstances of the particular case and 
rests largely within its discretion." 
The State should not support Mr. Pommier's series of what 
are either improper State investigations, or break-ins. 
Point III: THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE 
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY 
TO PROVE HIS DEFENSES. 
It seems little enough to ask that the Government retain 
either samples of the chemicals found at the premises, or test 
those which it chooses to destroy. Detective Yeates had 
testified there were 80 to 100 chemicals at the home. (S 15). 
Photographs were received, over defense objection, into evidence 
(Trial Transcript pp. 83, 84, 85) showing a large number of items 
of jugs and jars and bottles. On that basis, doubtless the jury 
concluded this was a case of massive drug manufacture. Small 
samples of the drugs could've been easily preserved. Surely a 
small vial of each chemical would not have filled more than a few 
shoeboxes, and the danger of storage wouldfve been de minimis. 
Probably these samples and their itemization could've been done 
is just a few hours work. If the State declined to store any one 
chemical deemed especially dangerous, it could've sampled that 
one, and stored in small vials the innocuous others. Some of the 
chemicals were still in their original shipping containers (S 
25), and doubtless posed no more danger in storage than they did 
in public shipping. 
The jury, faced with tests having been done on a few samples 
only, and many of those tests having been incriminating, was not 
allowed to focus on the vast number of indisputably legal 
chemicals. The destruction of a vast bulk of chemicals implied 
to the jury that what they tested was merely the tip of the 
iceberg. The destruction deprived Defendant of the right to 
demonstrate test results showing chemicals completely consistent 
and possibly exclusively useful for such things as his production 
of fertilizer, materials to change p.h. of the soil (Trial 
transcript, hereinafter "R2" vol. 2, p. 500), and plant growth 
hormone (R2 495). This ability, and these negative inferences, 
were vital to the issue of guilt or innocence. 
Instead, the State selectively took samples from what it 
thought most useful in its case, and undoubtedly considered from 
its long drug enforcement experience what would be most harmful 
to its prosecution. The State did not simply allow evidence to 
be lost by neglect or age. The State affirmatively destroyed it. 
In any event, the allowing into evidence of photographs and other 
evidence of the vast bulk without saving samples or testing, to 
prove the bulk of the chemicals were completely innocent, was 
unduly and vitally prejudicial to Defendant. 
Points IV and V: THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR 
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO 
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR 
TRANSFERRING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AND IS A DEPRIVATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF PROSCRIBED 
CONDUCT. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 
683 (Utah 1977), expressly held it an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power to delegate to the State Attorney General 
the power to schedule as a controlled substance a drug not listed 
in the legislative enactment. This was the second part of the 
Gal lion decision, the first part dealing with separation of 
powers concerns. Concerning this second part, the Court stated, 
at 690: 
"A determination of the elements of a crime and the 
appropriate punishment therefore are, under our 
Constitutional system, judgments, which must be made 
exclusively by the legislature." 
The only difference between Gal lion and our case is that the 
drug is not Demerol, but P-2-P, and that the Attorney General is 
the U.S. Attorney General, but the underlying rationale and ratio 
decendis are the same. The same constitutional problem with the 
same type of statute survives into the new law. 
By the Gal lion decision, the Supreme Court placed Utah in a 
group of states whose highest courts have found their state's 
enactment of the Controlled Substance Law unconstitutional. 
Further, the decision, as may be applied to incorporation of 
federal statutes, is in accord with a very respectable line of 
cases holding that adoption of prospective federal legislation or 
federal administrative rules constitutes an unconstitutional 
delegation of state legislative powers, especially where the 
delegation is in futuro, .ad infinitum. These cases are adequately 
dealt with in the Appellant's Brief, and not seriously questioned 
by the State. 
The State reminds us that statutes have a presumption of 
validity, and that the burden is on the challenging party. The 
State cites Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1984). Algom states, at 190, that: 
lfAn analysis of the constitutionality of Sec. 59-5-4.5 must 
begin with the proposition that acts of the Legislature are 
presumed constitutional, especially when dealing with 
economic matters based on factual assumptions." (Citations.) 
The presumption admits of degrees, then. The case at bar 
does not deal with "economic matters based on factual 
assumptions", as did Algom, which analyzed tax matters, so a 
lesser degree is warranted here. 
The State argues that it is "impracticable" for the Utah 
Legislature to make its own findings as to which substances 
should be controlled. Doubtless it is more convenient for the 
Legislature to abdicate these decisions to the federal 
government, but that does not dispense with the argument that it 
is unconstituional. Nor does the fact that Gal lion is 12 years 
old deprive it of its force. The court can hardly take judicial 
notice that all "explosion" in the development of the drug 
industry was post-Gallion (1977), as the State urges us. 
Furthermore, it is the illicit drug industry we are concerned 
with, not the regulation and approval of all drugs. 
Is it impracticable? Cannot the legislature review the 
federal regulations just put into effect, say, once a year, and 
prohibit those drugs it agrees should be controlled? This would 
not entail great expense, yet it would preserve the prerogative 
of the Utah voters in having their own legislative 
representatives be the ones to make their criminal laws. Cannot 
the legislature itself appoint a standing committee, or create a 
legislative entity under its control, to monitor developments? 
Citing three federal cases, the State reminds us that there 
is ample federal authority for the delegation by the federal 
congress to U.S. Attorney General. However, this misses the 
point entirely, since federal delegation to federal government 
misses the entire federalism problem raised by a state 
legislature delegating to a federal official. This federal 
authority, in any event, even if it dealt with state delegation, 
would not overturn Gal lion. 
Now, for the first time in this case, in its brief on appeal 
(pp. 27, 31, and 32), the State apparently alleges, though not 
without confusion, that the possession of P-2-P, as a precursor, 
was an illegal drug under Utah law alone, without reference to 
federal law. The argument starts that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-
2(4) (Supp. 1988), in pertinent part, defines "as used in this 
chapter", the term "controlled subtance" "means a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules I, II, 
III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug, 
substance or immediate precursor included in Schedules I, II, 
III, IV or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act...as those 
schedules may be revised to add..." 
Presumably, the State infers that because the words 
"immediate precursor" were used in the statute above, that, if P-
2-P were in chemical fact an immediate precursor, that it is 
thereby included, or that a reasonable man is put on notice that 
P-2-P was being proscribed by the mere reference to "immediate 
precursor." First, the obvious meaning of the statute does not 
include all possible generic "immediate prescursors", no more 
than it does all possible "substance" or "drug", but only those 
specified, i.e. only those immediate precursors "included in 
schedules I, II, III, IV or V of Section 58-37-4...". That is, 
it includes only named immediate precursors. P-2-P is not named 
in the Utah Act. 
The State's argument also misses Sec. 58-37-2(16): 
"'Immediate precursor' means a substance which the 
Attorney General of the Unitd States has found to be, and by 
regulation designated as being, the principal compound used 
or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a 
controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical 
intermediary used or likly to be used in the manufacture of 
a controlled subtance, the control of which is necessary to 
prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled 
substance." 
In short, "immediate precursor" cannot be determined without 
delegation to federal laws, in futuro ad infinitum. Without 
reference to federal law, there is no State "immediate 
precursor". Therefore, the use of the word "immediate precursor" 
in 58-37-2 can't put anyone on notice a particular substance is a 
proscribed precursor, without that person having to search the 
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. Immediate 
precursors cannot be found, where not scheduled by name 
explicitly, to be proscribed by State law only in 58-37-2, since 
the phrase itself finds its definition in the federal lists. 
The State would convince us that Defendant violated Section 
58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B). Those sections read: 
"(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall consist of 
the following drugs or other substances, by whatever 
official name, common or usual name, chemical name or brand 
name designated: 
(b) Schedule II: 
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in 
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or 
preparation which contains any quantity of the following 
substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous 
system: 
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts 
of its optical isomers 
(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of 
its isomers" 
Nothing here states a precursor is a salt, isomer, or salt 
of its isomer. Counsel knows of no evidence or issue put on at 
trial that P-2-P was a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, or 
amphetamine or methamphetamine. 
What is clear is that the case went to the jury on 
instructions, not that they were to determine if P-2-P was a 
precursor, or a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, but simply that 
it was a controlled substance. Instruction SA-2 provided, in 
part, the elements the prosecution had to prove were as follows: 
"1. That on or about 1987 or 1988, in Box Elder 
County, State of Utah; 
2. That the Defendant did, knowingly and 
intentionally; 
3. Manufacture; 
4. A controlled substance, to-wit, P-2-P." 
Instructions 3 and 4 are to the same effect, the difference 
being merely between possession vs. manufacture. Even more 
strikingly, Instruction No. 5 states flatly: "You are instructed 
that Phenyl-2-Propanone or P2P is a controlled substance under 
the laws of the State of Utah." Defendant was not tried on 
manufacture of a "salt", nor of a "precursor". 
In short, Gal,..lion prohibits this statutory delegation 
expressly. Nothing in the State statutes, without reference to 
the delegation to the federal, prohibit P-2-P, nor was the case 
tried or submitted on a "precursor" nor "salt" theory. There is 
no reasonable basis on which the GalljLon result can be avoided. 
The delegation to the U.S. Attorney General is especially onerous 
as to precursors, due to the fact that the Attorney General's 
findings requirement, and medical and scientific evaluations, 
can, as for precursors, be dispensed with altogether. (21 USCA 
811(e)). 
Point VI: THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION THAT THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE 
PROPRIETY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TO-
BE-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
Gallion, at 689, allows a Defendant the right to "challenge 
the administrative procedure and the findings where a substance 
has been scheduled or rescheduled". Defendant asked for 
Instruction 1 to comply with that, and it was refused. Objection 
was made, and preserved. This is reversible error, in that, had 
the instruction been given, since the State had not offered 
testimony showing compliance by the U.S. Attorney General, the 
jury would've had to conclude P-2-P was not a controlled 
substance, and acquitted. Defendant raised the GaJHjDn/federal 
delegation issue generally, at pre-trial (Trial Transcript, Vol. 
1, 30-45), and at the end of the State's evidence, when Defendant 
moved for directed verdict (R2 425), but Gal lion-concerned 
motions were denied (Trial Transcript vol. 1 p. 45, R2 431-3). 
At Trial Transcript Vol. 1, page 39, counsel for Defendant makes 
an express issue of the State having to prove administrative 
compliance, just before the jury was empanelled. He said, "You 
also get into a vast complex area here with regard to proof, 
issues of proof, what they have to prove. Presumably the State 
here is going to have to prove that the U.S.--United States 
Attorney General properly exercised the authority, held the 
proper hearings, properly issued, promulgated, did everthing 
needed to in order to get it into the Federal Regulations, into 
the Code of Federal Regulations as they're accepted by Congress." 
Gal lion states this right, which was raised in the instructions. 
By this pre-trial statement, the State was put on notice of its 
challenge, but chose not to meet it. The prosecution failed to 
establish the element of compliance with the federal enactment. 
CONCLUSION 
The matters raised herein are in response to certain matters 
raised in the Respondent's Brief, and do not waive nor diminish 
those points argued in the Appellant's Brief. It is respectfully 
submitted that evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant 
was obtained by illegal search and siezure, based on insufficient 
probable cause, that the evidence should be suppressed based on 
illegal search and siezure by a government agent, or one who 
should be treated as such, that the destruction of evidence was a 
deprivation of due process, that the authority given the U.S. 
Attorney General to schedule and change schedules of drugs was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and failed to 
give notice of proscribed conduct, and that the denial of a jury 
instruction that the State must prove propu££ federal^ enactment 
was reversible error. 
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